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Abstract. Information flow is the branch of security that studies the leakage of information
due to correlation between secrets and observables. Since in general such correlation cannot
be avoided completely, it is important to quantify the leakage. The most followed approaches
to defining appropriate measures are those based on information theory. In particular, one
of the most successful approaches is the recently proposed g-leakage framework, which
encompasses most of the information-theoretic ones. A problem with g-leakage, however, is
that it is defined in terms of a minimization problem, which, in the case of large systems,
can be computationally rather heavy. In this paper we study the case in which the
channel associated to the system can be decomposed into simpler channels, which typically
happens when the observables consist of multiple components. Our main contribution is
the derivation of bounds on the (multiplicative version of) g-leakage of the whole system
in terms of the g-leakages of its components. We also consider the particular cases of
min-entropy leakage and of parallel channels, generalizing and systematizing results from
the literature. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our method and evaluate the precision
of our bounds using examples.
1. Introduction
The problem of preventing confidential information from being leaked is a fundamental
concern in the modern society, where the pervasive use of automatized devices makes it hard to
predict and control the information flow. For instance, the output of a program might reveal
information about a sensitive variable, or side channel information might reveal the secret key
stored in a smart card. While early research focused on trying to achieve non-interference (i.e.,
no leakage), it is nowadays recognized that, in practical situations, some amount of leakage
is unavoidable. Therefore an active area of research on information flow is dedicated to the
development of theories to quantify the amount of leakage, and of methods to minimize it. See,
for instance, [CHM01, Mal07, KB07, CPP08a, CPP08b, Bor09, Smi09, BPP11, ACKP17].
Key words and phrases: quantitative information flow, compositionality, information leakage, min-entropy
leakage, g-leakage.
A preliminary version of this work, without proofs, appeared in [KCP14].
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Among these theories, min-entropy leakage [Smi09, BCP09] has become quite popular,
partly due to its clear operational interpretation in terms of one-try attacks. This quite basic
setting has been recently extended to the g-leakage framework [ACPS12]. The main novelty
consists in the introduction of gain functions, that permit to quantify the vulnerability of
a secret in terms of the gain of the adversary, thus allowing to model a wide variety of
operational scenarios and different adversaries 1. For instance, min-entropy, Shannon entropy
and guessing entropy can all be seen as instances of g-vulnerability [ACPS12, ACM+14].
While g-leakage is appealing for its generality and flexible operational interpretation, its
computation is not trivial. Like most of the quantitative approaches, its definition is based
on the probabilistic correlation between the secrets and the observables. Such correlation
is usually expressed in terms of an information-theoretic channel, where the secrets and
the observables respectively constitute the input and the output. Note that the channel
abstracts from the specific model describing the system. A program is usually expressed
in a programming language while a protocol might be better described by an automaton.
Still, in both cases, the leakage only depends on the conditional probabilities of each output
given input, i.e., on the channel matrix. The computation of the channel matrix from the
system can be performed via model checking (see, e.g., [APvRS10]), if a system is completely
specified and it is not too complicated. Once the matrix is known, the computation of the
g-leakage involves solving an optimization problem. In fact, computing leakage involves
finding the “guess” that optimizes the expected gain of the adversary [ACPS12]. This can
be quite costly when the matrix is large.
Worse yet, in many cases it is not possible to compute the channel matrix exactly, for
instance because the system may be too complicated, or because the conditional probabilities
are partially determined by unknown factors. Fortunately, there are statistical methods
that allow to approximate the channel matrix and the leakage [CCG10, CKNP13, KBL16,
BKLT17]. There is also a tool, leakiEst [CKN13], which allows to estimate min-entropy
leakage from a set of trial runs [CKN14b, CK14]. However, if the cardinality of secrets
and observables is large, such estimation becomes computationally heavy, due to the huge
amount of trial runs that need to be performed.
In this paper we determine bounds on g-leakages in compositional terms, focusing on
the multiplicative version of g-leakage. More precisely, we consider the parallel composition
of channels, defined on the cross-products of the inputs and of the outputs. Then, we derive
lower and upper bounds on the g-leakage of the whole channel in terms of the g-leakages
of the components. Since the size of the whole channel is the product of the sizes of the
components, there is an evident benefit in terms of computational cost. Table 1 illustrates the
situation for the various kinds of channel matrices (small, large white-box, large black-box):
the first three rows characterize the situation, and the last three express the feasibility of
computing the leakage of the components, the matrix of the whole system, and the leakage
of the whole system, respectively. This computation is meant to be exact in the first two
columns, and statistical in the last one. The number of components is assumed to be huge.
Note that the size of the whole channel matrix increases exponentially with the number of
the components.
We evaluate our compositionality results on randomly generated channels and on Crowds,
a protocol for anonymous communication, run on top of a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET).
In such a network users are mobile, can communicate only with nearby nodes, and the
1In fact, all convex functions can be expressed in terms of g-vulnerability [ACM+16].
ON THE COMPOSITIONALITY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION FLOW 3
Kinds of systems small large white-box large black-box
Input distribution pi known known known
Component channels Ci known known approx. statistically
Leakage of Ci with pii computable computable approx. statistically
Composed channel C computable unfeasible unfeasible
Leakage of C with pi computable unfeasible unfeasible
Table 1: Computation of information leakage measures in various scenarios.
network topology changes frequently. As a result, Crowds routes can become invalid forcing
the user to re-execute the protocol to establish a new route. These protocol repetitions,
modeled by the composition of the corresponding channels, lead to more information being
leaked. Although the composed channel quickly becomes too big to compute the leakage
directly, our compositionality results allow to obtain bounds on it.
The results of this paper are about the multiplicative version of g-leakage, which is the
original one considered in [ACPS12]. Some of the auxiliary results are about the posterior
g-vulnerability. There is also an additive version of g-leakage, investigated in [ACM+14].
At a preliminary analysis, the adaption of our results to the additive one is not trivial. We
leave this for future work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces basic notions of infor-
mation theory, defines compositions of channels, and presents information leakage measures.
Section 3 presents lower/upper bounds for g-leakages in compositional terms. Section 4
instantiates these results to min-entropy leakages. Section 5 introduces a transformation
technique which improves the precision of our method. Section 6 presents a way of computing
leakage bounds using the cascade composition refinement. Section 7 compares our results
on g-leakage with the compositionality results on Shannon mutual information. Section 8
evaluates our results by experiments. Section 9 discusses related work.
A preliminary version of this paper, without proofs, appeared in [KCP14]. This paper
improves the bounds on g-leakage. The new, tighter bounds are formally stated in Propo-
sition 3.6, Lemma 3.7, Theorem 3.9 and Proposition 3.17. Furthermore, it extends some
results to the case of n-ary composition (Propositions 3.17, 3.18, 5.5 and 5.6) and presents
some new properties (Propositions 3.4, 3.5, 3.6). Finally, Section 6, 7 and 9 are new.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we recall the notion of information-theoretic channels, define channel compo-
sitions/decomposition, and recall some information leakage measures.
2.1. Channels. A discrete channel is a triple (X ,Y, C) consisting of a finite set X of
secret input values, a finite set Y of observable output values, and an |X | × |Y| matrix C,
called channel matrix, where each element C[x, y] represents the conditional probability
p(y|x) of obtaining the output y ∈ Y given the input x ∈ X . The input values have a
probability distribution, called input distribution or prior. Given a prior pi on X , the joint
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Figure 1: The two kinds of parallel compositions on channels, × and ‖.
distribution for X and Y is defined by p(x, y) = pi[x]C[x, y]. The output distribution is
given by p(y) =
∑
x∈X
pi[x]C[x, y].
2.2. Composition of Channels. We now introduce the two kinds of compositions which
will be considered in the paper. Figure 1 illustrates their definitions:
• In the parallel composition C1×C2 with distinct inputs, two channels C1 and C2 separately
receive inputs drawn from two distributions X1 and X2, respectively (Figure 1a).
• In the parallel composition C1 ‖ C2 with shared inputs, C1 and C2 receive an identical
input value drawn from a distribution X (Figure 1b).
In these compositions we assume that the channels are independent, in the sense that,
given the respective inputs, the outcome of one channel does not influence the outcome of
the other.
These two kinds of compositions are used to represent different situations. For example,
in the Crowds protocol (explained in Section 8.1), an execution of the protocol is modeled as
a channel C from secret senders X to observable outputs Y . Then repeated executions of the
protocol with (possibly) different senders are described by the parallel composition C × C,
while repeated executions with the same sender are described by the parallel composition
with shared input C ‖ C.
We start with defining parallel composition with separate inputs × (parallel composition
for short). Note that the term “parallel” here does not carry a temporal meaning: the actual
execution of the corresponding systems could take place simultaneously or in any order.
Definition 2.1 (Parallel composition (with distinct inputs)). Given two discrete channels
(X1,Y1, C1) and (X2,Y2, C2), their parallel composition (with distinct inputs) is the discrete
channel (X1 ×X2,Y1 × Y2, C1 × C2) where C1 × C2 is the (|X1| · |X2|)× (|Y1| · |Y2|) matrix
such that for each x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2, y1 ∈ Y1 and y2 ∈ Y2,
(C1 × C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)] = C1[x1, y1] · C2[x2, y2].
The condition (C1 × C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)] = C1[x1, y1] · C2[x2, y2] is what we mean by
“the channels are independent”. Note that, although the output distributions Y1 and Y2
may be correlated, they are conditionally independent, in the sense that p(y1, y2|x1, x2) =
p(y1|x1)p(y2|x2).
Next, we define the parallel composition with shared input ‖.
Definition 2.2 (Parallel composition with shared input). Given two discrete channels
(X ,Y1, C1) and (X ,Y2, C2), their parallel composition with shared input is the discrete
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channel (X ,Y1 × Y2, C1 ‖ C2) where C1 ‖ C2 is the |X | × (|Y1| · |Y2|) matrix such that for
each x ∈ X , y1 ∈ Y1 and y2 ∈ Y2,
(C1 ‖ C2)[x, (y1, y2)] = C1[x, y1] · C2[x, y2].
Note that ‖ is a special case of ×. In fact, (C1 ‖ C2)[x, (y1, y2)] = C1[x, y1] · C2[x, y2] =
(C1 × C2)[(x, x), (y1, y2)].
2.3. Decomposition of Channels. Sometimes it can be useful to decompose a large
system for analysis purposes: the components may be easier to analyze than the whole
system. Here, given a channel that outputs pairs in Y1 × Y2, we consider the sub-channels
that output on Y1 and Y2 separately. Depending on whether we wish to perform an analogous
separation also on the inputs or not, we obtain two kinds of decomposition.
Definition 2.3 (Decomposition). The decomposition of a discrete channel (X ,Y1 × Y2, C)
with respect to Y1 and Y2 is a pair of channels (X ,Y1, C|Y1) and (X ,Y2, C|Y2) where
C|Y1 [x, y1] =
∑
y2∈Y2
C[x, (y1, y2)]
C|Y2 [x, y2] =
∑
y1∈Y1
C[x, (y1, y2)].
For a channel (X ,Y1 × Y2, C1 ‖ C2) with shared input, we have (C1 ‖ C2)|Yi = Ci for
each i ∈ { 1, 2 }.
2.4. Quantitative Information Leakage Measures. The information leakage of a chan-
nel is measured as the difference between the prior uncertainty about the secret value of
the channel’s input and the posterior uncertainty of the input after observing the channel’s
output. The uncertainty is defined in terms of an attacker’s operational scenario. In this
paper we will focus on min-entropy leakage, in which such measure, min-entropy, represents
the difficulty for an attacker to guess the secret inputs in a single attempt.
Definition 2.4 (Vulnerability). Given a prior pi on X and a channel (X ,Y, C), the prior
vulnerability and the the posterior vulnerability are defined respectively as
V (pi) = max
x∈X
pi[x]
V (pi,C) =
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
pi[x]C[x, y].
Definition 2.5 (Min-entropy leakage). Given a prior pi on X and a channel (X ,Y, C), the
min-entropy H∞(pi) and conditional min-entropy H∞(pi,C) are defined by:
H∞(pi) = − log V (pi)
H∞(pi,C) = − log V (pi,C).
The min-entropy leakage I∞(pi,C) and min-capacity C∞(C) are defined by:
I∞(pi,C) = H∞(pi)−H∞(pi,C)
C∞(C) = sup
pi′
I∞(pi′, C).
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Min-entropy leakage has been generalized by g-leakage [ACPS12], which allows a wide
variety of operational scenarios of attacks. These are modeled using a set W of possible
guesses, and a gain function g :W ×X → [0, 1] such that g(w, x) represents the gain of the
attacker when the secret value is x and he makes a guess w on x.
Then g-vulnerability is defined as the maximum expected gain of the attacker:
Definition 2.6 (g-vulnerability). Given a prior pi on X and a channel (X ,Y, C), the prior
g-vulnerability and the posterior g-vulnerability are defined respectively by
Vg(pi) = max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
pi[x]g(w, x)
Vg(pi,C) =
∑
y∈Y
max
w∈W
∑
x∈X
pi[x]C[x, y]g(w, x).
We now extend Definition 2.5 to the g-setting:
Definition 2.7 (g-leakage, g-capacity). Given a prior pi on X and a channel (X ,Y, C), the
g-entropy Hg(pi), conditional g-entropy Hg(pi,C) and g-leakage Ig(pi,C) are defined by:
Hg(pi) = − log Vg(pi),
Hg(pi,C) = − log Vg(pi,C),
Ig(pi,C) = Hg(pi)−Hg(pi,C).
The g-capacity Cg(C) is defined as the maximum g-leakage over all priors.
Cg(C) = sup
pi′
Ig(pi
′, C).
Here are a few examples of gain functions introduced in [ACPS12].
Example 2.8 (Identity gain function). The identity gain function represents the situation
in which an attacker’s guess w is worthy only when it is the correct secret value x. Formally,
it is defined as the following function gid : X × X → [0, 1]:
gid(w, x) =
{
1 if x = w
0 otherwise.
The min-entropy notions are particular cases of the g-entropy ones, obtained by instantiating
g to gid; i.e., H∞ = Hgid , I∞ = Igid and C∞ = Cgid .
Example 2.9 (Binary gain functions). The gain functions returning boolean values are
called binary. They are parameterized with a collection W ⊆ 2X of guess sets such that the
attacker gains when the correct secret belongs to his guessed set w ∈ W. Intuitively, they
represent the gain of the adversary by guessing a secret partially. Formally, it is defined as
the following function gW :W ×X → [0, 1]:
gW(w, x) =
{
1 if x ∈ w
0 otherwise.
The identity gain function gid in Example 2.8 is a particular case of a binary gain function.
Example 2.10 (k-tries gain function). For any positive integer k, the k-tries gain function
models a scenario in which an attacker is allowed to make guesses on the secret k times.
Formally, the set of guesses is defined by:
Wk = {w ∈ 2X : #w ≤ k}.
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Composition Measure Lower bound Upper bound
prior g-entropy Proposition 3.5 Proposition 3.6
Composition posterior g-entropy Lemma 3.7 (1) Lemma 3.7 (2)
with distinct with independent priors Corollary 3.8
input × g-leakage Theorem 3.9 (1) Theorem 3.9 (2)
with independent priors Corollary 3.10
n-ary composition Proposition 3.17 Proposition 3.17
Composition posterior g-entropy Theorem 3.12 —
with shared g-leakage — Theorem 3.13
input ‖ n-ary composition — Proposition 3.18
Table 2: Compositionality results for g-leakage.
Then the k-tries gain function is defined as the binary gain function gWk .
3. Compositionality Results on g-Leakage
In this section we present compositionality results for g-leakage. To obtain them we
introduce the notions of joint gain functions for composed channels (Section 3.1) and of
jointly supported distributions (Section 3.2). Then we show compositionality theorems for
g-leakage that provide a certain lower and an upper bound on the g-leakage of a composed
system (Sections 3.3 and 3.4). Finally, we extend these results from binary to n-ary channels
(Section 3.5). The summary of these results are shown in Table 2.
3.1. Joint Gain Functions for Composed Channels. In this section we introduce the
notion of joint gain functions, which will be used to formalize the g-leakages of composed
channels.
A joint gain function g is defined as a function from (W1×W2)×(X1×X2) to [0, 1]. When
a joint secret input is (x1, x2) ∈ X1×X2 and the attacker’s joint guess is (w1, w2) ∈ W1×W2,
the attacker’s joint gain from the guesses is represented by g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)).
For the sake of generality, we do not assume any relation between g and the two gain
functions g1 and g2, except for the following: a joint guess is worthless iff at least one of the
single guesses is worthless. Formally: g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) = 0 iff g1(w1, x1)g2(w2, x2) = 0.
2
We say that g1 and g2 are independent if g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) = g1(w1, x1)g2(w2, x2) for
all x1, x2, w1 and w2.
3.2. Jointly Supported Distributions. In this section we define some notions on proba-
bility distributions to obtain compositionality results on g-leakage.
Given a joint distribution pi on X1 ×X2, the marginal distribution pi1 on X1 is defined
as pi1[x1] =
∑
x2∈X2 pi[x1, x2] for all x1 ∈ X1. The marginal distribution pi2 on X2 is defined
analogously. Note that pi1[x1] · pi2[x2] = 0 implies pi[x1, x2] = 0 . The converse does not hold
in general, but occasionally we will assume it:
2This property holds, for example, when g, g1, g2 are the identity gain functions.
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Definition 3.1. A joint distribution pi on X1 × X2 is jointly supported if, for all x1 ∈ X1
and x2 ∈ X2, pi1[x1] · pi2[x2] 6= 0 implies pi[x1, x2] 6= 0.
Essentially, this condition rules out all the distributions in which there exist two events
that happen with a non-zero probability, but that never happen together, i.e., events that
are incompatible with each other.
For example, pi is jointly supported when pi1 and pi2 are independent; i.e., pi[x1, x2] =
pi1[x1] · pi2[x2] for all x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2. Hereafter we denote such pi by pi1 × pi2.
3.3. The g-Leakage of Parallel Composition with Distinct Input. In this section we
present a lower and an upper bound for the g-leakage of C1×C2 in terms of the g-leakages of
C1 and C2. We first introduce some notations to represent the bounds (Section 3.3.1). Then
we present compositionality results on the prior g-entropy Hg(pi) (Section 3.3.2), the posterior
g-entropy Hg(pi,C1 × C2) (Section 3.3.3) and the g-leakage Ig(pi,C1 × C2) (Section 3.3.4).
3.3.1. Measures Mming,pi and M
max
g,pi . We introduce two measures M
min
g,pi and M
max
g,pi that capture
certain relationships between the joint prior/gain function and their marginals, which will be
used to provide the lower and upper bounds on the g-leakage of composed channels. These
measures are defined using the following set:
Definition 3.2. Let pi be a prior on X1 ×X2, and g : (W1 ×W2)× (X1 ×X2)→ [0, 1] be a
joint gain function. For w1 ∈ W1 and w2 ∈ W2, their support with respect to g is defined as:
Sw1,w2 = {(x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2 |pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) 6= 0} .
The two measures Mming,pi and M
max
g,pi are defined as follows.
Definition 3.3. Let g be a joint gain function from (W1 ×W2)× (X1 ×X2) to [0, 1]. Let
g1, g2 be two gain functions from W1 ×X1 to [0, 1] and from W2 ×X2 to [0, 1] respectively.
Given a prior pi on X1 ×X2, we define Mming,pi and Mmaxg,pi by:
Mming,pi = min
w1∈W1,w2∈W2
min
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
Mmaxg,pi = max
w1∈W1,w2∈W2
max
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) .
Intuitively, Mming,pi and M
max
g,pi represent how the joint distribution pi and joint gain
function g are far from the cases where pi1 and g1 are respectively independent of pi2 and of
g2. Computing these values do not involve the channel matrix, and has a time complexity
of O(#W1 ×#W2 ×#X1 ×#X2), which is smaller than the complexity of computing the
g-leakage of the composed channel: O(#W1 ×#W2 ×#X1 ×#X2 ×#Y1 ×#Y2). Note
that the definition of Mmaxg,pi is different from the preliminary version [KCP14] of this work
in that we take the maximum over Sw1,w2 instead of the summation over them. Thanks to
this improvement we obtain better compositionality results (Proposition 3.6, Lemma 3.7,
Theorem 3.9 and Proposition 3.17).
These two measures Mming,pi and M
max
g,pi satisfy the following properties. When pi1 and pi2
are independent and g1 and g2 are independent, M
min
g,pi = M
max
g,pi = 1. In addition, for any
prior pi, Mming,pi is strictly positive.
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Proposition 3.4. For any prior pi and any joint gain function g, Mming,pi > 0.
Proof. Let pi be any prior on X1×X2 and g be any gain function from (W1×W2)× (X1×X2)
to [0, 1]. Since probabilities and gains are non-negative, it suffices to show that Mming,pi 6= 0. Let
w1 ∈ W1, w2 ∈ W2 and (x1, x2) ∈ Sw1,w2 . We have pi[x1, x2] 6= 0 and g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) 6= 0.
Then, by the definition of joint gain functions, g1(w1, x1)g2(w2, x2) 6= 0. In addition, we
obtain pi1[x1] · pi2[x2] 6= 0 from pi[x1, x2] 6= 0. Hence pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2) 6= 0
Therefore Mming,pi 6= 0.
3.3.2. The g-Entropy of Joint Prior. In this section we present a lower and an upper bound
on the (prior) g-entropy Hg(pi).
The g-entropy Hg(pi) of a joint prior pi is bounded from below by the summation of
logMming,pi and the g-entropies of its two marginals pi1, pi2:
Proposition 3.5. For any prior pi on X1 ×X2,
Hg(pi) ≥ Hg1(pi1) +Hg2(pi2) + logMming,pi .
Proof. See Appendix A.
To obtain an upper bound for the g-entropy Hg(pi) of a joint prior pi, we assume that pi is
jointly supported. Then the upper bound is the summation of logMmaxg,pi and the g-entropies
of its two marginals pi1, pi2:
Proposition 3.6. For any jointly supported prior pi on X1 ×X2,
Hg(pi) ≤ Hg1(pi1) +Hg2(pi2) + logMmaxg,pi .
Proof. See Appendix A.
3.3.3. The Posterior g-Entropy of Parallel Composition. Next we show a lower and an upper
bound on the posterior g-entropy Hg(pi,C1 × C2).
Lemma 3.7. For any prior pi on X1 × X2 with marginals pi1 and pi2, and two channels
(X1,Y1, C1), (X2,Y2, C2),
(1) Hg(pi,C1 × C2) ≥ Hg1(pi1, C1) +Hg2(pi2, C2) + logMming,pi
(2) Hg(pi,C1 × C2) ≤ Hg1(pi1, C1) +Hg2(pi2, C2) + logMmaxg,pi if pi is jointly supported.
Proof. . See Appendix A.
The equalities in Lemma 3.7 hold if the priors and the gain functions are independent:
Corollary 3.8. If g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) = g1(w1, x1)g2(w2, x2) for all x1, x2, w1 and w2, then,
for any pi1 and pi2, we have
Hg(pi1 × pi2, C1 × C2) = Hg1(pi1, C1) +Hg2(pi2, C2).
Proof. By the independence of the priors and the gain functions, we have Mming,pi = M
max
g,pi = 1.
Hence the claim follows.
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3.3.4. The g-Leakage of Parallel Composition. Now we show a lower and an upper bound
for the g-leakage of the parallel composition. To obtain this we assume that the prior is
jointly supported.
Theorem 3.9. Let pi be a jointly supported prior on X1×X2 with marginals pi1 and pi2. Let
(X1,Y1, C1), (X2,Y2, C2) be two channels. Then:
(1) Ig(pi,C1 × C2) ≥ Ig1(pi1, C1) + Ig2(pi2, C2)− logM
max
g,pi
Mming,pi
,
(2) Ig(pi,C1 × C2) ≤ Ig1(pi1,C1) + Ig2(pi2,C2) + logM
max
g,pi
Mming,pi
.
Proof.
Ig(pi,C1 × C2)
=Hg(pi)−Hg(pi,C1 × C2)
≤Hg(pi)−Hg1(pi1, C1)−Hg2(pi2, C2)− logMming,pi (By Lemma 3.7)
≤ (Hg1(pi1)−Hg1(pi1, C1)) + (Hg2(pi2)−Hg2(pi2, C2)) + logMmaxg,pi − logMming,pi
(By Proposition 3.6)
= Ig1(pi1, C1) + Ig2(pi2, C2) + log
Mmaxg,pi
Mming,pi
.
The other inequality is proven using Lemma 3.7 and Proposition 3.5 in an analogous way.
Again, the equality holds if the priors and gain functions are independent:
Corollary 3.10. If two gain functions g1 and g2 are independent, then Ig(pi1×pi2, C1×C2) =
Ig1(pi1, C1) + Ig2(pi2, C2).
Proof. By the independence of the priors and the gain functions, we have Mming,pi = M
max
g,pi = 1.
Hence the claim follows.
3.4. The g-Leakage of Parallel Composition with Shared Input. In this section we
present compositionality results for g-leakage when two channels share the same input value.
The parallel composition with shared input corresponds to the parallel composition with
two identical inputs values: (C1‖C2)[x, (y1, y2)] = C1[x, y1]C2[x, y2] = (C1×C2)[(x, x), (y1, y2)].
To give the same input value x to both C1 and C2, the prior pi
† on X × X is defined from a
prior pi on X by:
pi†[x, x′] =
{
pi[x] if x = x′
0 otherwise
Then Hg(pi,C1 ‖ C2) = Hg(pi†, C1 × C2). In addition, pi†1[x] = pi†2[x] = pi[x].
As we see in the definition, the attacker’s gain is determined solely from a secret input
x and his guess w on x (and independently of channels that receive x as input). Let g
be a gain function from W × X to [0, 1]. Since C1 and C2 receive input from the same
domain X , we use the same gain function g to calculate both the g-leakages of C1 and C2.
Since an identical input value x is given to C1 and C2 in the composed channel C1 ‖ C2
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and the attacker makes a single guess w on the secret x, we define the joint gain function
g† : W ×W ×X ×X → [0, 1] from g by:
g†((w,w′), (x, x′)) =
{
g(w, x) (if w = w′ and x = x′)
0 (otherwise)
If pi†[x, x′] · g†((w,w′), (x, x′)) 6= 0, then w = w′ and x = x′. Let (W × X )+ = { (w, x) ∈
W × X | pi[x]g(w, x) 6= 0 }. By pi†1[x] = pi†2[x] = pi[x], Mminpi† = min(w,x)∈(W×X )+ pi[x]g(w, x)
and Mmax
pi† = maxw∈W
∑
x∈X pi[x]g(w, x). Then Hg(pi) = − logMmaxpi† .
To describe compositionality results, we introduce the following notation.
Definition 3.11. For any prior pi on X and any gain function g : W ×X → [0, 1], we define
Hming (pi) by:
Hming (pi) = − log min {pi[x]g(w, x) : x ∈ X , w ∈ W, pi[x]g(w, x) 6= 0} .
Then, for any prior pi, Hming (pi) = − logMminpi† and Hming (pi) ≥ Hg(pi). Note that
computing Hming (pi) does not involve the channel matrix, and has a time complexity of
O(#W × #X ), which is smaller than the complexity of computing the g-leakage of the
composed channel: O(#W ×#X ×#Y1 ×#Y2).
Since pi† is not jointly supported, we can instantiate compositionality results only on a
lower bound for the posterior g-entropy in Lemma 3.7 (1). The lower bound for the posterior
g-entropy Hg(pi,C1 ‖ C2) of a channel composed in parallel with shared inputs is described
using Hming (pi) and the posterior g-entropies of its two components:
Theorem 3.12. For any prior pi on X and two channels (X ,Y1, C1) and (X ,Y2, C2),
Hg(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≥ Hg(pi,C1) +Hg(pi,C2)−Hming (pi).
Proof. We instantiate Lemma 3.7 by taking g1 and g2 as g, pi as pi
† and X1 = X2 = X :
Hg(pi
†, C1 × C2) ≥ Hg(pi†1, C1) +Hg(pi†2, C2) + logMminpi† .
By pi†1[x] = pi
†
2[x] = pi[x] for all x ∈ X , logMminpi† = −Hming (pi) and Hg(pi,C1 ‖ C2) =
Hg(pi
†, C1 × C2), the theorem follows.
An upper bound on the g-leakage Ig(pi,C1 ‖ C2) of a channel composed in parallel with
shared inputs is described using the g-leakages of its two components in the following theorem.
On the other hand, since pi† is not jointly supported, we cannot instantiate Theorem 3.9
hence cannot obtain a lower bound for the leakage.
Theorem 3.13. For any prior pi on X and two channels (X ,Y1, C1) and (X ,Y2, C2),
Ig(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≤ Ig(pi,C1) + Ig(pi,C2) +Hming (pi)−Hg(pi).
Proof.
Ig(pi,C1 ‖ C2)
=Hg(pi)−Hg(pi,C1 ‖ C2)
≤Hg(pi)−Hg(pi,C1)−Hg(pi,C2) +Hming (pi) (By Theorem 3.12)
≤ (Hg(pi)−Hg(pi,C1)) + (Hg(pi)−Hg(pi,C2))−Hg(pi) +Hming (pi)
= Ig(pi,C1) + Ig(pi,C2) +H
min
g (pi)−Hg(pi).
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We emphasize this result holds for any prior. Note that in the right-hand side of the
above inequality, Hming (pi)−Hg(pi) is necessary as the following illustrates.
Example 3.14. Let us consider the channel (X ,Y, C) where X = Y = { 0, 1 } and C
is the 2 × 2 matrix defined by C[0, 0] = C[1, 1] = 0.9 and C[0, 1] = C[1, 0] = 0.1. Let
g be the identity gain function gid and pi be the prior on X such that pi[0] = 0.1 and
pi[1] = 0.9. Then Hg(pi) = Hg(pi,C) = − log 0.9, Hg(pi,C ‖ C) = − log 0.972. Therefore
Ig(pi,C ‖ C) = log 1.08 > 0 = Ig(pi,C) + Ig(pi,C).
Note that the inequality of Theorem 3.13 does not give a useful upper bound when the
prior pi is very far from the uniform distribution. In this example, by Hming (pi)−Hg(pi) = log 9,
the left-hand side is log 1.08 ≈ 0.111 while the right-hand side is log 9 ≈ 3.170.
On the other hand, the result may not hold when the composition of channels is done
in a dependent way, which is not a parallel composition. The following is a counterexample:
Example 3.15. Let X = Y1 = Y2 = {0, 1}, pi be the uniform distribution on X and g be
the identity gain function. We consider the channel that, given an input x ∈ X , outputs a
bit y1 uniformly drawn from Y1 and the exclusive OR y2 of x and y1. Then the g-leakage
of the channel is 1 while both of the g-leakages from X to Y1 and from X to Y2 are 0 and
Hming (pi)−Hg(pi) = 0. Hence the property expressed by Theorem 3.13 in general does not
hold if we replace ‖ with some other kind of composition.
3.5. Extension to n-ary composition. In this section we extend some of the previous
compositionality results to the case of n-ary parallel compositions. Let I = {1, 2, . . . , n} be
the index set. The n-ary compositions, with distinct and shared inputs, are denoted by:∏
i∈I Ci = C1×C2× · · · ×Cn and ‖i∈I Ci = C1 ‖C2 ‖ · · · ‖Cn. The definitions of Mming,pi and
Mmaxg,pi are extended to n-ary compositions as follows.
Definition 3.16. LetW =W1×· · ·×Wn, X = X1×· · ·×Xn and g be a joint gain function
from W ×X to [0, 1]. For i ∈ I, let gi be a gain function from Wi × Xi to [0, 1]. Given a
prior pi on X , we define:
Mming,pi = min
w∈W
min
x∈Sw
∏
i∈I pii[xi]gi(wi, xi)
pi[x] · g(w, x)
Mmaxg,pi = max
w∈W
max
x∈Sw
∏
i∈I pii[xi]gi(wi, xi)
pi[x] · g(w, x)
where w = (w1, w2, · · · , wn) and x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn).
For the n-ary composition with distinct input we obtain the following extension of
Theorem 3.9 by using the above measures Mming,pi and M
max
g,pi for the n-ary composition.
Proposition 3.17. For any jointly supported prior pi on X and channels (Xi,Yi, Ci) for
i ∈ I, ∑
i∈I
Igi(pii, Ci)− log
Mmaxg,pi
Mming,pi
≤ Ig
(
pi,
∏
i∈I
Ci
)
≤
∑
i∈I
Igi(pii, Ci) + log
Mmaxg,pi
Mming,pi
.
Proof. The proof is by Theorem 3.9 and by induction on I.
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Composition Measure Lower bound Upper bound
Composition posterior min-entropy Corollary 4.1 (1) Corollary 4.1 (2)
with distinct with independent priors Corollary 4.1 (3)
input × min-entropy leakage Corollary 4.2 (1) Corollary 4.2 (2)
with independent priors Corollary 4.2 (3)
min-capacity Corollary 4.3 (first appeared in [BK11])
Composition posterior min-entropy Corollary 4.4 (1) Corollary 4.4 (2)
with shared min-entropy leakage Corollary 4.4 (3) Corollary 4.4 (4)
input ‖ min-capacity — Corollary 4.5 (first appeared in [ES13])
Table 3: Compositionality results for min-entropy leakage.
Theorem 3.13 also extends naturally to the n-ary shared input case:
Proposition 3.18. For any prior pi on X and channels (X ,Yi, Ci) for i ∈ I,
Ig(pi, ‖i∈ICi) ≤
∑
i∈I
Ig(pi,Ci) + (#I − 1) ·
(
Hming (pi)−Hg(pi)
)
.
Proof. The proof is by Theorem 3.13 and by induction on I.
4. Compositionality Results on Min-Entropy Leakage
In this section we present compositionality results for min-entropy leakage, which we recall
is a particular case of g-leakage obtained when g is the identity gain function. The results
here are instances of the results for g-leakage in the previous section while they yield
compositionality theorems for min-capacity. The summary of these results are shown in
Table 3.
4.1. Min-Entropy Leakage of Parallel Composition with Distinct Input. In this
section we derive bounds for the min-entropy leakage of the parallel composition with distinct
input.
We start by remarking that, when the gain functions are identity gain functions, Mming,pi
and Mmaxg,pi reduce to M
min∞,pi and Mmax∞,pi defined as:
Mmin∞,pi = min
(x1,x2)∈(X1×X2)+
pi1[x1] · pi2[x2]
pi[x1, x2]
Mmax∞,pi = max
(x1,x2)∈(X1×X2)+
pi1[x1] · pi2[x2]
pi[x1, x2]
where (X1 ×X2)+ = {(x1, x2) ∈ X1 ×X2 : pi[x1, x2] 6= 0}.
The next results are consequences of the results of Section 3:
Corollary 4.1. For any prior pi on X1 ×X2 and two channels (X1,Y1, C1), (X2,Y2, C2),
(1) H∞(pi,C1 × C2) ≥ H∞(pi1, C1) +H∞(pi2, C2) + logMmin∞,pi,
(2) H∞(pi,C1 × C2)≤H∞(pi1, C1) +H∞(pi2, C2) + logMmax∞,pi if pi is jointly supported,
(3) if pi = pi1 × pi2, then H∞(pi1 × pi2, C1 × C2) = H∞(pi1, C1) +H∞(pi2, C2).
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Proof. By taking g, g1, g2 as the identity gain functions, Hg(pi1 × pi2, C1 × C2) = H∞(pi1 ×
pi2, C1 × C2), Hg1(pi1, C1) = H∞(pi1, C1), Hg2(pi2, C2) = H∞(pi2, C2), Mming,pi = Mmin∞,pi and
Mmaxg,pi = M
max∞,pi . Then the first and second claims follow from (1) and (2) of Lemma 3.7
respectively. If pi1 and pi2 are independent we have M
min∞,pi = Mmax∞,pi = 1, hence the last claim
follows.
Corollary 4.2. For any jointly supported prior pi on X1×X2 and two channels (X1,Y1, C1),
(X2,Y2, C2),
(1) I∞(pi,C1 × C2) ≥ I∞(pi1, C1)+I∞(pi2, C2)− logM
max∞,pi
Mmin∞,pi
,
(2) I∞(pi,C1 × C2) ≤ I∞(pi1, C1)+I∞(pi2, C2) + logM
max∞,pi
Mmin∞,pi
,
(3) if pi = pi1 × pi2, then I∞(pi1 × pi2, C1 × C2) = I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2).
Proof. By taking g, g1, g2 as the identity gain functions, Ig(pi1 × pi2, C1 × C2) = I∞(pi1 ×
pi2, C1×C2), Ig1(pi1, C1) = I∞(pi1, C1), Ig2(pi2, C2) = I∞(pi2, C2), Mming,pi = Mmin∞,pi and Mmaxg,pi =
Mmax∞,pi . Then the first and second claims follow from Theorem 3.9 and the last from
Corollary 3.10 respectively.
The min-entropy leakage coincides with the min-capacity when the prior pi is uniform.
Thus we re-obtain the following result from the literature [BK11]:
Corollary 4.3. For any two channels (X1,Y1, C1) and (X2,Y2, C2),
C∞(C1 × C2) = C∞(C1) + C∞(C2).
Proof. Let pi be the uniform distribution on X1×X2. Then pi = pi1×pi2. Hence C∞(C1×C2) =
I∞(pi,C1 × C2) = I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2) by Corollary 4.2. Since pi1 and pi2 are also
uniformly distributed, we obtain I∞(pi1, C1) = C∞(C1) and I∞(pi2, C2) = C∞(C2). Therefore
C∞(C1 × C2) = C∞(C1) + C∞(C2).
Note that [BK11] does not present any compositionality result for min-entropy leakage
while proving the result for min-capacity in a different way.
4.2. Min-Entropy Leakage of Parallel Composition with Shared Input. In this
section we show bounds on the min-entropy leakage of the parallel composition with shared
input. As corollaries of Theorems 3.12 and 3.13 we obtain the compositionality results for
the posterior min-entropy and the min-entropy leakage by taking g as the identity gain
function gid. Then for any prior pi on X , Hming (pi) is instantiated to the following:
Hmin(pi) = − log min {pi[x] | x ∈ X , pi[x] 6= 0} .
Then Hmin(pi) ≥ log |X | ≥ H∞(pi).
Corollary 4.4. For any prior pi on X and channels (X ,Y1, C1) and (X ,Y2, C2),
(1) H∞(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≥ H∞(pi,C1) +H∞(pi,C2)−Hmin(pi),
(2) H∞(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≤ min{H∞(pi,C1), H∞(pi,C2)},
(3) I∞(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≥ max{I∞(pi,C1), I∞(pi,C2)},
(4) I∞(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≤ I∞(pi,C1) + I∞(pi,C2) +Hmin(pi)−H∞(pi).
Proof. When w = x, pi[x]gid(w, x) = pi[x] holds . Hence H
min
gid
(X) = Hmin(X). By definition,
Hgid(pi,C1 ‖C2) = H∞(pi,C1 ‖C2), Hgid(pi,C1) = H∞(pi,C1), Hgid(pi,C2) = H∞(pi,C2) and
Hgid(pi) = H∞(pi). Then the claims follow from Theorems 3.12 and 3.13.
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Composition Measure Lower bound Upper bound
with distinct min-entropy leakage Theorem 5.3 Theorem 5.3
input × n-ary composition Proposition 5.5 Proposition 5.5
with shared min-entropy leakage — Theorem 5.4
input ‖ n-ary composition — Proposition 5.6
Table 4: Compositionality results for min-entropy leakage of black-box systems obtained by
input approximation.
The min-entropy leakage coincides with the min-capacity when the prior pi is uniform.
If pi is uniform we have Hmin(pi) = H∞(pi). Thus we re-obtain the following result from the
literature [ES13]:
Corollary 4.5. For any two channels (X ,Y1, C1) and (X ,Y2, C2),
C∞(C1 ‖ C2) ≤ C∞(C1) + C∞(C2).
The following is an example of the above inequality.
Example 4.6. Consider the channel (X ,Y, C) shown in Example 3.14. Let pi be the
uniform prior on X . Then H∞(pi) = 1, H∞(pi,C) = H∞(pi,C ‖ C) ≈ 0.152. Hence
C∞(C ‖ C) = H∞(pi)−H∞(pi,C ‖ C) ≈ 0.848 while C∞(C) + C∞(C) ≈ 1.696.
5. Improving Leakage Bounds by Input Approximation
The compositionality results shown in the previous sections may not give good bounds when
the prior is far from the uniform distribution, as illustrated in Example 3.14. In particular,
probabilities that are closer to 0 in priors make our leakage bounds much worse.
Since such small probabilities do not affect true g-leakage values much, they can
be removed from the priors while this may cause little error on g-leakage values. In
the following we present a way of improving bad g-leakage bounds by removing small
probabilities from priors. We call it input approximation technique. The idea of removing
small probabilities is reminiscent of the notion of smooth entropy [Cac97], although the
motivation and technicalities are different. For simplicity we will only show the case of
min-entropy leakage, i.e., when g is the identity gain function. The summary of the results
are shown in Table 4.
5.1. Bounds for White-Box Channels. We first consider the case in which an analyst
knows the channel components. Given a prior pi on X we construct a sub-probability
distribution of pi from which small probabilities are removed as follows. Let X ′ be a
non-empty proper subset of X such that
max
x′∈X ′
pi[x′] ≤ min
x∈X\X ′
pi[x].
Then max
x∈X\X ′
pi[x] = max
x∈X
pi[x]. Let  =
∑
x′∈X ′
pi[x′]. We define a function pi|X\X ′ : X → [0, 1] by:
pi|X\X ′ [x] =
{
0 if x ∈ X ′
pi[x] otherwise
16 YUSUKE KAWAMOTO, KONSTANTINOS CHATZIKOKOLAKIS, AND CATUSCIA PALAMIDESSI
Then pi|X\X ′ is a sub-probability distribution, as it does not sum up to 1; i.e.,
∑
x∈X
pi|X\X ′ [x]
< 1. However, the results in previous sections do not require pi to be a probability distribution,
and neither do the definitions of entropy and leakage. Errors caused by the above input
approximation are bounded as follows:
Theorem 5.1. For any prior pi on X , channel (X ,Y, C),  ≥ 0 and the set X ′ defined as
above,
I∞(pi|X\X ′ , C) ≤ I∞(pi,C) ≤I∞(pi|X\X ′ , C) + log
(
1 +

V (pi|X\X ′ , C)
)
.
Proof.
V (pi,C) =
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈X
pi[x]C[x, y]
≤
∑
y∈Y
(
max
x∈X\X ′
pi[x]C[x, y] +
∑
x′∈X ′
pi[x′]C[x′, y]
)
=
∑
y∈Y
(
max
x∈X\X ′
pi[x]C[x, y]
)
+
∑
x′∈X ′
(
pi[x′]
∑
y∈Y
C[x′, y]
)
=
∑
y∈Y
(
max
x∈X\X ′
pi[x]C[x, y]
)
+ 
= V (pi|X\X ′ , C) + .
By max
x∈X\X ′
pi[x] = max
x∈X
pi[x], we have V (pi|X\X ′) = V (pi). Then
I∞(pi,C) = log
V (pi,C)
V (pi|X\X ′)
≤ log V (pi|X\X ′ , C) + 
V (pi|X\X ′)
= log
(
V (pi|X\X ′ , C)
V (pi|X\X ′)
· V (pi|X\X ′ , C) + 
V (pi|X\X ′ , C)
)
= I∞(pi|X\X ′ , C) + log
(
1 +

V (pi|X\X ′ , C)
)
.
On the other hand, by V (pi|X\X ′ , C) ≤ V (pi,C), we obtain I∞(pi|X\X ′ , C) ≤ I∞(pi,C).
So, the idea is to remove very small probabilities in priors and then apply our compo-
sitional approach to derive bounds illustrated in a previous section. This will allow us to
obtain better bounds, as small probabilities affect dramatically the precision of our approach,
while removing them produces only relatively small errors as shown in Theorem 5.1.
More precisely, the technique works as follows. Consider a channel C composed of C1
and C2 in parallel and a joint prior pi on X1 × X2. We take X1 × X2 as X in the input
approximation procedure and Theorem 5.1. To apply our compositional approach, we take
a X ′ ⊆ X1 ×X2 so that pi|X\X ′ is jointly supported. Then we apply Corollary 4.2 to obtain
a lower and an upper bound for I∞(pi|X\X ′ , C). Finally we apply Theorem 5.1 to obtain
bounds for the original I∞(pi,C).
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y0 y1 y2
x0 0.50 0.23 0.27
x1 0.20 0.40 0.40
x2 0.21 0.43 0.36
Figure 2: Channel matrix.
Example 5.2. Consider the channel (X ,Y, C) for X = {x0, x1, x2}, Y = {y0, y1, y2} and
C is given in Figure 2. We assume the prior pi such that pi(x0) = 0.01, pi(x1) = 0.49 and
pi(x2) = 0.50, is shared among channels. Then the min-entropy leakage of the channel C
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composed of ten C’s in parallel is 0.1319, while our upper bound is 0.7444 when  = 0.01.
On the other hand, the upper bound obtained using min-capacity [BK11] is 4.114, which is
much larger than ours.
5.2. Bounds for Channels Composed of Black-Box Channels. In some situations
an analyst may not know the channel matrices C1, C2 and therefore cannot calculate
I∞(pi|X\X ′ , Ci) or V (pi|X\X ′ , Ci) (necessary to apply Corollary 4.2), while he may know the
information leakages I∞(pi1, C1) and I∞(pi2, C2). Our input approximation technique allows
us to obtain bounds also in this case, although less precise than in the case of known channels.
Hereafter we let pi′ = pi|X\X ′ . We obtain the following from Theorem 5.1:
Theorem 5.3. For any jointly supported prior pi on X1×X2, two channels (X1,Y1, C1) and
(X2,Y2, C2),  > 0 and the sub-distribution pi′ defined as above,
I∞(pi,C1 × C2) ≥ I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2)
− log M
max
∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
− log V (pi1, C1)
V (pi1, C1)−  − log
V (pi2, C2)
V (pi2, C2)− 
I∞(pi,C1 × C2) ≤ I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2)
+ log
Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
+ log
max(V (pi1, C1), V (pi2, C2)
max(V (pi1, C1), V (pi2, C2))− .
Proof. By the first claim in the proof for Theorem 5.1, V (pi′, C1×C2) ≥ V (pi,C1×C2)−  ≥
max(V (pi1, C1), V (pi2, C2))− . Then
I∞(pi,C1 × C2) ≤ I∞(pi′, C1 × C2) + log
(
1 + V (pi′,C1×C2)
)
≤ I∞(pi′, C1 × C2) + log
(
1 + max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2))−
)
≤ I∞(pi′1, C1) + I∞(pi′2, C2) + log
Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
+ log
(
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2)
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2))−
)
(By Corollary 4.2)
≤ I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2) + log
Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
+ log
(
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2)
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2))−
)
(By Theorem 5.1)
18 YUSUKE KAWAMOTO, KONSTANTINOS CHATZIKOKOLAKIS, AND CATUSCIA PALAMIDESSI
The other inequality is shown as follows.
I∞(pi,C1 × C2) ≥ I∞(pi′, C1 × C2) (By Theorem 5.1)
≥ I∞(pi′1, C1) + I∞(pi′2, C2)− log
Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
(By Corollary 4.2)
≥ I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2)− log
Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
− log
(
V (pi′,C1)+
V (pi′,C1)
)
− log
(
V (pi′,C2)+
V (pi′,C2)
)
(By Theorem 5.1)
≥ I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2)− log
Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
− log
(
V (pi,C1)
V (pi,C1)−
)
− log
(
V (pi,C2)
V (pi,C2)−
)
Theorem 5.4. For any prior pi on X , two channels (X ,Y1, C1) and (X ,Y2, C2),  > 0 and
the sub-distribution pi′ defined as above,
I∞(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≤ I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2)
+ log
max(V (pi1, C1), V (pi2, C2))
max(V (pi1, C1), V (pi2, C2))−  +H
min(pi′)−H∞(pi′).
Proof. Recall that pi′ = pi|X\X ′ . Then by Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 4.4,
I∞(pi,C1 ‖ C2)
≤ I∞(pi′, C1 ‖ C2) + log
(
1 + V (pi′,C1‖C2)
)
≤ I∞(pi′, C1 ‖ C2) + log
(
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2))
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2))−
)
≤ I∞(pi′1, C1) + I∞(pi′2, C2) +Hmin(pi′)−H∞(pi′) + log
(
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2)
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2))−
)
≤ I∞(pi1, C1) + I∞(pi2, C2) +Hmin(pi′)−H∞(pi′) + log
(
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2)
max(V (pi1,C1),V (pi2,C2))−
)
In the right-hand side of these theorems V (pi1, C1) and V (pi2, C2) are calculated from
V (pi1), V (pi2), I∞(pi1, C1) and I∞(pi2, C2). So it is sufficient for an analyst to know only pi,
I∞(pi1, C1) and I∞(pi2, C2) to calculate the above leakage bounds.
It is easy to see that these bounds are not as good as those in Section 5.1. Also they
are more sensitive to the choice of . If we take a very small , the input approximation
does not improve substantially, as neither
Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
nor Hmin(pi′) −H∞(pi′) decreases much.
In fact, when  = 0 these theorems coincide with Corollaries 4.2 and 4.4. If we take a
very large , then the error caused by the input approximation is also very large, while
Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
and Hmin(pi′) −H∞(pi′) are close to 0. In Section 8.2 we will present experiments
on the input approximation and illustrate that we should take  as a value less than
max{V (pi1, C1), V (pi2, C2)}.
5.3. Extension to n-ary Composition. The input approximation techniques illustrated
in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 can be extended to n-ary composition. The following results can be
proven by induction on I, where the inductive steps are similar to the proofs of Theorems 5.3
and 5.4, respectively. In the following X ′ is defined as in Section 5.1, and pi′ = pi|X\X ′ .
ON THE COMPOSITIONALITY OF QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION FLOW 19
Proposition 5.5. For any channels (Xi,Yi, Ci) with i ∈ I, X = X1 × . . . × Xn and any
jointly supported prior pi on X ,
I∞
(
pi,
∏
i∈I
Ci
)
≥
∑
i∈I
(
I∞(pii, Ci)− log
( V (pii, Ci)
V (pii, Ci)− 
))
− log M
max
∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
I∞
(
pi,
∏
i∈I
Ci
)
≤
(∑
i∈I
I∞(pii, Ci)
)
+ log
 maxj∈I V (pij , Cj)
max
j∈I
V (pij , Cj)− 
+ log Mmax∞,pi′
Mmin∞,pi′
.
Proposition 5.6. For any channels (X ,Yi, Ci) with i ∈ I and any prior pi on X ,
I∞(pi, ‖i∈ICi) ≤
∑
i∈I
I∞(pii, Ci) + (#I − 1)·(Hmin(pi′)−H∞(pi′)) + log
( max
j∈I
V (pij , Cj)
max
j∈I
V (pij , Cj)− 
)
.
6. Leakage Bounds by Channel Approximation
The leakage bounds can be computed more efficiently by using simpler channels that
over/under-approximate the original complicated system. In this section we show how to
compute the leakage bounds using channels related by the cascade composition refinement.
6.1. Comparing Composed Channels. The comparison of channels from the viewpoint of
information leakage has been investigated in several studies such as [YT10, Mal15, ACPS12].
The cascade composition refinement v is shown to be useful to compare the g-leakages of
two channels.
Definition 6.1. For any two channels (X ,Z, C1) and (X ,Y, C2), we write C1 v C2 if there
exists a channel (Y,Z, C3) such that C1[x, z] = C2[x, y] · C3[y, z] for any x ∈ X , y ∈ Y and
z ∈ Z.
Remark 6.2. Note that, for the relation C1 v C2 to be defined, C1 and C2 need to have
the same input domain, but not necessarily the same output domain.
We obtain the following results.
Proposition 6.3. Let C1, C2, C
′
1 and C
′
2 be channel matrices.
(1) If C1 v C ′1, then C1 × C2 v C ′1 × C2.
(2) If C1 v C ′1 and C2 v C ′2, then C1 × C2 v C ′1 × C ′2.
(3) If C1 v C ′1, then C1 ‖ C2 v C ′1 ‖ C2.
(4) If C1 v C ′1 and C2 v C ′2, then C1 ‖ C2 v C ′1 ‖ C ′2.
Proof. Immediate from Definitions 2.1, 2.2 and 6.1.
The cascade composition refinement and the g-leakage ordering coincide: Alvim et
al. [ACPS12] show that C1 v C2 implies Ig(pi,C1) ≤ Ig(pi,C2) for all priors pi and gain
functions g; McIver et al. [MMS+14] show the converse implication.
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6.2. Approximate Leakage Bounds by Channel Approximation. In this section we
show some refinement results that can be used to reason about lower/upper bounds on
information leakage of huge channels. These are straightforward from Proposition 6.3 and
compositionality results in previous sections.
Given two complicated systems modeled as channels (X1,Y1, C1) and (X2,Y2, C2) respec-
tively, we consider simpler systems that are described as channel matrices C ′1, C ′2, C ′′1 and C ′′2
such that C ′1 v C1 v C ′′1 and C ′2 v C2 v C ′′2 . The following result shows that an analyzer can
learn a lower/upper bound on the g-leakage Ig(pi,C1×C2) from the knowledge/computation
of Ig1(pi1, C
′
1) and Ig2(pi2, C
′
2) or that of Ig1(pi1, C
′′
1 ) and Ig2(pi2, C
′′
2 ), without calculating the
g-leakages of the two original channels C1 and C2:
Proposition 6.4. For any jointly supported prior pi on X1 ×X2,
(1) Ig(pi,C1 × C2) ≥ Ig1(pi1, C ′1) + Ig2(pi2, C ′2)− log M
max
g,pi
Mming,pi
.
(2) Ig(pi,C1 × C2) ≤ Ig1(pi1, C ′′1 ) + Ig2(pi2, C ′′2 ) + log M
max
g,pi
Mming,pi
.
Proof. By [ACPS12, MMS+14], C ′i v Ci v C ′′i iff Ig(pii, C ′i) ≤ Ig(pii, Ci) ≤ Ig(pii, C ′′i ) for
each i = 1, 2. Hence the claims are immediate from Proposition 6.3, Theorem 3.9.
Next we present a result for the case of shared input. Given two channels (X ,Y1, C1) and
(X ,Y2, C2) we consider two channel matrices C ′1 and C ′2 such that C1 v C ′1 and C2 v C ′2.
Then an analyzer can learn an upper bound on the g-leakage Ig(pi,C1 ‖ C2) from the
knowledge on Ig1(pi1, C
′
1) and Ig2(pi2, C
′
2), without calculating the g-leakages of two original
channels C1 and C2:
Proposition 6.5. For any jointly supported prior pi on X1 ×X2,
Ig(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≤ Ig1(pi1, C ′1) + Ig2(pi2, C ′2) +Hming (pi)−Hg(pi).
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 6.3 and Theorem 3.13.
7. Shannon Mutual Information
In this section we present compositionality results for Shannon mutual information for the
completeness of this paper. These are easily obtained from Shannon information theory by
applying it to our formalization of channel compositions.
Recall that, given a prior pi on X and a discrete channel (X ,Y, C), the mutual information
is defined as:
I(pi,C) =
∑
x∈X ,y∈Y
pi[x]C[x, y] log
(
C[x, y]∑
x′∈X pi[x′]C[x′, y]
)
.
Similarly to Corollary 3.10 for g-leakage, the mutual information of channels composed
in parallel is the summation of the mutual information of components when the priors are
independent.
Theorem 7.1. For any two priors pi1 on X1, pi2 on X2 and any two discrete channels
(X1,Y1, C1) and (X2,Y2, C2), we have
I(pi1 × pi2, C1 × C2) = I(pi1, C1) + I(pi2, C2).
Proof. Immediate from the independency of the random variables.
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In the case of shared input we have inequality like Theorem 3.13.
Theorem 7.2. For any prior pi on X and any two discrete channels (X ,Y1, C1) and
(X ,Y2, C2), we have
I(pi,C1 ‖ C2) ≤ I(pi,C1) + I(pi,C2).
Proof. This is derived from a property of the interaction information as follows. Let X be
the random variable for the input of the channels C1 and C2, and Y1 and Y2 be the two
random variables for the outputs of the two channels. Then
I(pi,C1 ‖ C2)− I(pi,C1)− I(pi,C2)
= I(X;Y1Y2)− I(X;Y1)− I(X;Y2)
= I(X;Y1|Y2) + I(X;Y2)− I(X;Y1)− I(X;Y2)
= I(X;Y1|Y2)− I(X;Y1)
= I(Y1;Y2|X)− I(Y1;Y2)
= −I(Y1;Y2) (by conditional independence)
≤ 0.
These results can be extended to the n-ary compositions:
Theorem 7.3. For any priors pii on Xi and any discrete channels (Xi,Yi, Ci) for i ∈ I, we
have
I
(∏
i∈I
pii,
∏
i∈I
Ci
)
=
∑
i∈I
I(pii, Ci).
Proof. By Theorem 7.1 and by induction on I.
Theorem 7.4. For any prior pi on X and any discrete channels (X ,Yi, Ci) for i ∈ I, we
have
I(pi, ‖i∈ICi) ≤
∑
i∈I
I(pi,Ci).
Proof. By Theorem 7.2 and by induction on I.
On the other hand, such a compositionality may not hold when the composition is
adaptive, i.e., when the channels depend on each other.
Proposition 7.5. There exist a prior pi on X and a discrete channel (X ,Y1 × Y2, C) with
two outputs such that I(pi,C) > I(pi,C|Y1) + I(pi,C|Y2).
Proof. For example, let X = Y1 = Y2 = {0, 1} and pi be the uniform distribution on X . We
consider the channel that, given an input x ∈ X , outputs a random bit y1 uniformly drawn
from Y1 and the exclusive OR of the two bits x and y1 as the second output, i.e, y2 :=x⊕ y1.
Formally, the channel matrix C is given by: C[0, (0, 0)] = C[0, (1, 1)] = 0.5, C[0, (0, 1)] =
C[0, (1, 0)] = 0, C[1, (0, 0)] = C[1, (1, 1)] = 0 and C[1, (0, 1)] = C[1, (1, 0)] = 0.5. Recall the
definition of decomposition of channels in Definition 2.3. Then, for all x ∈ X , y1 ∈ Y1 and
y2 ∈ Y2, C|Y1 [x, y1] = C|Y2 [x, y2] = 0.5.
The channel C leaks the bit x from y1 and y2 by x :=y1⊕y2, while neither C|Y1 nor C|Y2
leaks any information on x; i.e., I(pi,C) = 1 and I(pi,C|Y1) = I(pi,C|Y2) = 0. Therefore
I(pi,C) > I(pi,C|Y1) + I(pi,C|Y2).
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Remark 7.6. As shown in [ACM+14], Shannon entropy is a particular instance of g-
vulnerability. However, due to the presence of the logarithm that we consider here, the
compositionality of Shannon mutual information is not an instance of that of g-leakage.
8. Experimental Evaluation
In this section we evaluate our bounds in two use-cases: first, on the Crowds protocol for
anonymous communication, running on a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET), and second, on
randomly generated channels.
8.1. Crowds Protocol on a MANET. Crowds [RR98] is a protocol for anonymous
communication, in which participants achieve anonymity by forwarding messages through
other users. A group of n users, called the Crowd, participate in the protocol, and one
of them, called the initiator decides to send a message to some arbitrary recipient in the
network, called the server. The protocol works as follows: first the initiator selects randomly
(with uniform distribution) a member of the crowd, called the forwarder, and forwards the
message to him. A forwarder, upon receiving a message, throws a (biased) probabilistic coin:
with probability pf (a parameter of the system) he randomly selects a new forwarder and
advances the message to him, and with probability 1− pf he delivers the message directly
to the server. Replies from the server follow the inverse path to arrive to the initiator and
future requests use the already established route, to avoid repeating the protocol.
The goal of the protocol is to provide sender anonymity w.r.t. an attacker who does
not control the whole network, but controls only some of the nodes and can only see traffic
passing through them. Still, if the attacker controls some members of the crowd, strong
anonymity is not satisfied. A forwarding request from user i is evidence that i is the initiator
of the message. However, some anonymity is still provided since user i can always claim
that he was in fact only forwarding a message from user j. If the number of corrupted users
is relatively small, it is more likely that i is innocent (i.e. the initiator is user j 6= i) than
guilty, offering a notion of anonymity called probable innocence [RR98].
In this section we consider an instance of Crowds running on a mobile ad-hoc network,
in which users are mobile and can communicate only to neighbouring nodes hence the
network topology changes frequently. Due to the network changes, routes become invalid
and the initiator needs to rerun the protocol to establish a new route, which causes further
information leakage. Our goal is to measure how quickly the leakage increases as a function
of the number of re-executions. Concerning the attacker model, we assume that the attacker
(i) knows the network topology (this could be achieved using known protocols for MANETs,
e.g. [NND07]), (ii) controls some members of the crowd and (iii) controls the server. For a
given network topology, the system is modeled by a channel with inputs initi, meaning that
user i is the initiator. The observable events are forwj,k, meaning that user j forwarded
the message to the corrupted node k (possibly the destination server). A matrix element
C[initi, forwj,k] gives the probability that forwj,k happens when i is the initiator. Finally,
for channels C1, C2 modeling the protocol under different network topologies, the repetition
of the protocol is modeled as C1 ‖ C2.
As an anonymity metric, we use g-leakage with the 2-tries gain function gW2 , modeling
an attacker who can guess the initiator twice. Recall that W2 is the set of all subsets of X
with #X = 2, and gW2(w, x) is 1 if x ∈ w and 0 otherwise.
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We evaluate our compositionality results on a Crowds instance with 25 users, of which
one is corrupted, and with pf = 0.7. The network topology is generated by randomly adding
a connection between any two users with probability 0.4. For a given topology, the matrix is
computed by the PRISM model checker [KNP04], using a model similar to one of [Shm02].
Although executions in Crowds can be infinite, a finite state model can be employed, keeping
track of only the current forwarder instead of the full route. Then each element of the
channel matrix can be computed by PRISM as the probability of reaching the corresponding
state.
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Figure 3: Numbers of observations and bounds.
The g-leakage of a single execu-
tion can be directly computed from
the channel; however, for multiple ex-
ecutions, the channel quickly becomes
too big to be of practical use (already
at 5 repetitions). On the other hand,
g-leakage can be bounded using the
results in Section 4. The obtained
bounds for up to 9 protocol repetitions
are shown in Figure 3. Three varia-
tions are given in which the topology
changes every 2 executions, every 3 ex-
ecutions or always stays the same. All
bounds are computed using a uniform
prior and some randomly generated
channels. The experiments show that
the compositionality technique allows
us to obtain meaningful bounds when the system is too big to compute exact values.
Note that the assumption of uniformly chosen forwarders is standard for the Crowds
protocol, however it would be interesting to study how our results would change if we
considered non-uniform distributions. For instance, we could have a non-uniform distribution
if the possible forwarders were equipped with a notion of trust, like in [SHY10]. We leave
this for future work.
8.2. Evaluation on Randomly Generated Channels. In this section we evaluate our
bounds on min-entropy leakage using randomly generated channels. In particular, we
evaluate the improvement on the bounds due to the input approximation technique, and
the efficiency of our approach, which we have implemented as a library of leakiEst version
1.3 [CKN14a] that is an extension of leakiEst [CKN13] and is available online.
We first compare the exact leakage values with their upper bounds calculated using
the input approximation technique in the case of shared input. Figure 4 shows the average
upper bounds obtained from Theorem 5.1, that can be applied when we know the channel
matrix. Figure 5 shows those obtained from Theorem 5.4 that we can apply when we do
not know it. For both experiments we use randomly generated 10 × 10 channel matrices
C and a prior pi that contains some input with very small probabilities. We set  = 0.1 in
the first case and  = V (pi,C)/3 in the second one. We calculated the min-entropy leakage
I∞(pi,C ‖C ‖C ‖C ‖C ‖C) (composition of six C’s), and its lower and upper bounds, using
Corollary 4.4, Theorem 5.1 with the analyst’s knowledge about C and Theorem 5.6 without
the analyst’s knowledge about C.
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These cases give similar upper bounds as shown in Figures 4 and 5. The x-axis represents
noise levels of randomly generated matrices, which we define as the maximum values (over
rows of C) of the summations of the differences of probabilities from the uniform distributions.
For instance, when the noise level is 0.10, the average upper bound is 1.699 in the first case
(Figure 4) while it is 1.701 in the second (Figure 5).
These upper bounds depend on how we choose the parameter  for the input approxi-
mation technique. In particular upper bounds strongly depend on  in the case of unknown
channels. In Figure 5 we chose  = V (pi,C)/3 which gives a relatively good upper bound.
On the other hand, if we choose an  too large we may obtain useless bounds. Indeed, if we
set for instance  = 0.2, then we obtain upper bounds above the maximum possible leakage,
which is the (prior) min-entropy, and is always log 10 ≈ 3.322 (as shown in Figure 6) since
the input is shared.
Figure 7 shows average upper bounds on min-entropy leakages of randomly generated
100× 100 channels, with randomly generated priors, noise level 0.1, and  = 0.005. As we
can see from the figure, the gap between the lower and upper bounds increases with the
number of components.
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Finally we evaluate the efficiency of our method. We consider here the min-entropy
leakage. Figure 8 shows the execution time on a laptop (1.8 GHz Intel Core i5) for leakiEst
to compute the exact min-entropy leakages of the channels composed of randomly generated
10× 10 component channels, in comparison with the time to compute their upper bounds.
To compute the exact leakages, we used leakiEst with an option that calculates the leakages
from exact matrices. As we can see, the execution time for the exact values increases rapidly.
In fact, the size of composed channel increases exponentially with the number of components,
so the complexity of this computation is at least exponential.
For a large number of components, the time to calculate upper bounds increases linearly
as shown in Figure 9. As for the computation of the exact values with leakiEst, we expected
an exponential blow-up, but we could not check it since we run out of memory because of
the size of the matrices.
9. Related Work
Compositionality of qualitative information flow properties has been widely studied e.g.
in [Man02, McL94, ZL97]. Although security properties do not compose in general [McC88],
most type systems for secure information flow are compositional, which facilitates qualitative
analyses of programs [SM03].
On the other hand, compositionality of quantitative information flow is a more recent
topic and not yet widely explored. In [Bor09], Boreale shows the compositionality of the
leakage and that of the leakage rate for the Shannon entropy in a process calculus. In [BK11],
Barthe and Ko¨pf present the compositionality of the min-capacity for the parallel composition
with distinct inputs. They also consider the min-capacity of an adaptive composition C1 +C2,
which they call sequential composition, where the second channel C2 receives both input
and output of C1. In [ES13], Espinoza and Smith show the compositionality of min-entropy
leakage and min-capacity for the parallel composition with shared input as well as for the
cascade composition. We are not aware of any prior compositionality result for g-leakage.
Recently more fine-grained composition has been considered. Kawamoto and Given-
Wilson [KG15] show that our compositionality result gives an upper bound on the information
leakage in scheduler-dependent systems where a scheduler interleaves the outputs of different
components.
26 YUSUKE KAWAMOTO, KONSTANTINOS CHATZIKOKOLAKIS, AND CATUSCIA PALAMIDESSI
10. Conclusion and Future Work
We have investigated compositional methods to derive bounds on g-leakage. To improve the
precision of the bounds, we have proposed a technique based on the idea of approximating
priors by removing small probabilities up to a parameter . From our experimental results
we have found that the dependency of the precision on  is not straightforward. We leave
for future work the problem of determining optimal values for . We also want to explore
a possible relation between our technique and the notion of smooth entropies from the
information theory literature [Cac97]. This could allow us to develop a more principled
approach to the input approximation technique.
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Appendix A. Omitted Proofs from Section 3
In this section we present omitted proofs. For brevity let X = X1 ×X2, Y = Y1 × Y2 and
W =W1 ×W2.
The support Sw1,w2 , defined in Definition 3.2, satisfies the following:
Lemma A.1. Let pi be jointly supported, and g1 :W1 × X1 → [0, 1], g2 :W2 × X2 → [0, 1].
Then for all (x1, x2) ∈ X \ Sw1,w2, pi1[x1] · g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2] · g2(w2, x2) = 0.
Proof. Let (x1, x2) ∈ X \ Sw1,w2 . By definition, we have pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) = 0.
Since pi is jointly supported, pi1[x1] · pi2[x2] = 0. By the definition of joint gain functions,
g1(w1, x1)g2(w2, x2) = 0. Hence pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2) = 0.
We present the proofs of Propositions 3.5, 3.6 and Lemma 3.7 as follows.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
Vg(pi) ·Mming,pi
= max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
· min
(w1,w2)∈W
min
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
≤ max
(w1,w2)∈W
( ∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
· min
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
)
≤ max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi[x1, x2]g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) · pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1)pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2]g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
(∵ For all (x1, x2) ∈ X \ Sw1,w2 , pi[x1, x2]g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) = 0.)
≤ max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2))
= max
w1∈W1
∑
x1∈X1
pi1[x1] · g1(w1, x1) · max
w2∈W2
∑
x2∈X2
pi2[x2] · g2(w2, x2)
= Vg1(pi1) · Vg2(pi2).
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Therefore
Hg(pi) =− log Vg(pi)
≥− log Vg1(pi1)− log Vg2(pi2) + logMming,pi
=Hg1(pi1) +Hg2(pi2) + logM
min
g,pi .
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
Vg(pi) ·Mmaxg,pi
= max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
· max
(w1,w2)∈W
max
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
≥ max
(w1,w2)∈W
( ∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
· max
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
)
≥ max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
= max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2) (∵ Lemma A.1)
=
(
max
w1∈W1
∑
x1∈X1
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1)
)
·
(
max
w2∈W2
∑
x2∈X2
pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
)
= Vg1(pi1) · Vg2(pi2).
Therefore
Hg(pi) =− log Vg(pi)
≤− log Vg1(pi1)− log Vg2(pi2) + logMmaxg,pi
=Hg1(pi1) +Hg2(pi2) + logM
max
g,pi .
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Proof of Lemma 3.7.
Vg(pi,C1×C2) ·Mming,pi
=
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi[x1, x2] · (C1×C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
· min
(w1,w2)∈W
min
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
≤
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
( ∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi[x1, x2] · (C1×C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
· min
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
)
≤
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2) · (C1×C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)]
(∵ For all (x1, x2) ∈ X \ Sw1,w2 , pi[x1, x2]g((w1, w2), (x1, x2)) = 0.)
≤
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2) · (C1×C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)]
=
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
( ∑
x1∈X1
pi1[x1]C1[x1, y1] g1(w1, x1) ·
∑
x2∈X2
pi2[x2]C2[x2, y2] g2(w2, x2)
)
=
( ∑
y1∈Y1
max
w1∈W1
∑
x1∈X1
pi1[x1]C1[x1, y1] g1(w1, x1)
)
·
( ∑
y2∈Y2
max
w2∈W2
∑
x2∈X2
pi2[x2]C2[x2, y2] g2(w2, x2)
)
= Vg1(pi1, C1) · Vg2(pi2, C2).
Therefore
Hg(pi,C1 × C2) =− log Vg(pi,C1 × C2)
≥− log Vg1(pi1, C1)− log Vg2(pi2, C2) + logMming,pi
=Hg1(pi1, C1) +Hg2(pi2, C2) + logM
min
g,pi .
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Vg(pi,C1×C2) ·Mmaxg,pi
=
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi[x1, x2] · (C1×C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
· max
(w1,w2)∈W
max
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
≥
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
( ∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi[x1, x2] · (C1×C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
· max
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2)
pi[x1, x2] · g((w1, w2), (x1, x2))
)
≥
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈Sw1,w2
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2) · (C1×C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)]
=
∑
(y1,y2)∈Y
max
(w1,w2)∈W
∑
(x1,x2)∈X
pi1[x1]g1(w1, x1) · pi2[x2]g2(w2, x2) · (C1×C2)[(x1, x2), (y1, y2)]
(∵ Lemma A.1)
=
( ∑
y1∈Y1
max
w1∈W1
∑
x1∈X1
pi1[x1]C1[x1, y1] g1(w1, x1)
)
·
( ∑
y2∈Y2
max
w2∈W2
∑
x2∈X2
pi2[x2]C2[x2, y2] g2(w2, x2)
)
= Vg1(pi1, C1) · Vg2(pi2, C2).
Therefore
Hg(pi,C1 × C2) =− log Vg(pi,C1 × C2)
≤− log Vg1(pi1, C1)− log Vg2(pi2, C2) + logMmaxg,pi
=Hg1(pi1, C1) +Hg2(pi2, C2) + logM
max
g,pi .
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